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Book Review 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Edition Ill 
American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., 
1980 
Since its long-awaited publication last year, the American 
Psychiatric Association's third edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-111) has 
occupied the center of the psychiatric stage. Many med­
ical students and residents are now routinely taught ac­
cording to its canons, and its system of mental disorders 
has become a quasi-official code in many of the public 
institutions where emotionally troubled and deviant peo­
ple are treated. 
There has not been, to my knowledge, a truly critical eval­
uation of the document. The very size of DSM-111 and the 
obvious care that has gone into its making seem to pre­
clude serious investigation of what it is all about. After all, 
if scores of psychiatric experts representing most of the 
institutions of professional power in this country end up 
agreeing on something after years of close deliberation, 
and if, moreover, they have taken such pains to come up 
with a seemingly liberal and progressive work, how can 
anyone find fault? Criticizing DSM-111 is to call into question 
the very existence of psychiatry today. 
And yet to accept the validity of DSM-111 because of the 
unanimity of opinion which went into it would be a most 
serious error. The massiveness of DSM-111 is after all no 
more than an indication that psychiatrists see things the 
same way, not that the way they see them is a true one. 
Furthermore, we know that people tend to see things alike 
because of a shared social interest; and since it is obvious 
that psychiatrists share such an interest, the weight of 
opinion that accompanies DSM-111 need not impress us 
at all. There are numerous incidents throughout history in 
which learned and influential men regarded things with 
amazing unanimity, and where later generations have found 
their perceptions absurd and even repellent. One need 
only recall the witch trials of the seventeenth century, when 
some of the finest minds in Europe concocted a system 
of "diagnosis" with a greater degree of "inter-rater relia­
bility" than even DSM-111 has been able to muster. We 
have no trouble in dismissing their arguments now, and 
we should have no more trouble therefore in taking a 
good, hard look at DSM-111, for only a critical inquiry into 
the structure of a phenomenon can decide its truthfulness. 
And this look must include consideration of the historical 
role which the phenomenon is to play. 
The phenomenon that is DSM-111 presents itself as a vast 
array of something called "mental disorders," which trou­
bled people are supposed to have as the source of their 
troubles. These disorders are rigorously enumerated in 
DSM-111 down to the second decimal place, and they are 
arranged in great formal categories. Elaborate "decision-
trees" are provided in each case for threading one's way 
through the maze of clinical phenomena until the under­
lying reality of the mental disorder is reached. There is 
only one conclusion that can be drawn from all this: the 
editors of DSM-111 are convinced that the essence of what 
troubles people can be most profitably reduced to the 
dimensions of purely medical-surgical diseases-in other 
words, that mental disorders will eventually sort them­
selves out as though they were caused by objects with 
extension and duration in the physical world, for it is only 
such objects that lend themselves to the kind of enu­
meration that dominates DSM-111. 
It is interesting to note that the editors are at pains to deny 
this implication quite early in their introduction to the vol­
ume, when they claim that mental disorders are not to be 
regarded as discrete entities. They say this, no doubt, 
because they know it to be true, and also because it is 
clearly a more progressive position, i.e., less likely to result 
in an objectionable labeling, if the concept of mental dis­
order be weakened a bit. Unfortunately, one cannot have 
it both ways. Either one really believes that mental dis­
orders are discrete, like bodies in the physical world, or 
one does not. And if one believes they are not discrete, 
then one does not go around spending years of effort 
figuring out ways to classify them as though they were 
elements in the periodic table. In other words, the prac­
tical relations advanced by DSM-111 are what counts in 
assessing its basic philosophical position, and not any 
incidental disclaimer on the part of the editors. These 
practical relations are quite definite: the patient is to be 
regarded as suffering from his mental disorder the way 
he might be suffering from a wart, and the clinician-psy­
chiatrist is to discern this by gazing dispassionately at the 
patient from the outside, the way one would examine a 
wart, or any purely objective phenomenon. 
This point is decisive, for it indicates the actual way DSM-
111 would have us work, the public relations with which it 
is promoted notwithstanding. According to those who pro­
mote it, DSM-111 is rich in environmental concern. All sorts 
of virtuous attention is paid to the social and cultural roots 
of emotional illness. The only omission in this nice scheme 
of things is the social relation of psychiatry itself. In other 
words the activity of the person who does the gazing is 
completely left out of the picture. This may seem like a 
minor point, in that the patient's emotional trouble is the 
focus, and not the psychiatrist. In reality, however, it makes 
all the difference in the world, for it defines the whole 
philosophical and political postion of DSM-111. Let us see 
how. 
In the first place, diagnosing DSM-111-style leads us to 
deny that the relations between people are what mental 
disturbance is all about. More basically, it denies the fun­
damental role of language and dialogue in human affairs. 
From the standpoint of the philosophy of science, this is 
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quite a barbaric position. Only consider how the most 
sophisticated of natural sciences, particle physics, has 
arrived through quantum mechanics at the conclusion that 
the behavior of the observing system is inextricably part 
of the observed system. If physics can recognize this 
truth, why must DSM-111 posit a pure observer when its 
very subject matter is grounded in discourse? We have 
here the reverse of the position taken by the ancients when 
they animistically projected human qualities onto a non­
human environment, say, the constellations of the heav­
ens. Under the banner of science today's psychodiagnos­
ticians project nonhuman qualities into the concept of 
mental disorder. 
Now this is no mere abstract intellectual error. It tends to 
disempower the patient by making him into a specimen 
of some disorder instead of a person who engages in 
dialogue. In dialogue, one can always answer back. Con­
sidered as the bearer of a purely objective "mental dis­
order," however, the patient inevitably gets treated like a 
thing and not a human being. Thus all the well-meaning 
attention paid to environmental factors becomes so much 
glitter covering a basically dehumanizing practice. At the 
most practical level, DSM-111 will inevitably encourage the 
young doctor-in-training to look coldly and from a distance 
instead of engaging in the often painful process of dia­
logue with the patient. It makes us look at the patient 
instead of talking to him or her. 
The whole notion of mental disorder is a good example 
of what Alfred North Whitehead called the fallacy of mis­
placed concreteness, which he thought was the single 
greatest error of modern science. According to this fal­
lacy, an abstraction from reality, in this case, a codified 
"mental disorder," is mistaken for the concrete experience 
for which it stands. Soon enough, psychiatry comes to 
believe in the reality of the abstraction instead of staying 
with the richness of human reality. In other words, psy­
chiatry becomes dehumanizing. 
It is of the utmost importance not to regard this as a simple 
intellectual error. Here is where the question of social 
interest-the force that displaces DSM-111 onto its path of 
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false abstraction-enters the picture. For DSM-111 is ulti­
mately a fraud, no matter how sincere any of the individ­
uals are who worked on it or who use it. It pretends to be 
in the scientific tradition, that is, to aid in the objective 
grasp of some part of the world, but in reality it is shaped 
for the convenience of the powerful institutions that control 
disturbed behavior in our society. Its true meaning, then, 
is political and economic. The mental health bureaucracy 
cannot function unless people are labeled and sorted out. 
This is so in the most literal way, in that reimbursement 
for care cannot be given unless some formal diagnosis 
is appended to each case. Mental disorders have to be 
numbered, not because they are real objects that can be 
sorted, but because numerical information has to be pro­
vided for the computers. DSM-111 conceals this motive, 
with all its unpleasant political ramifications, and makes 
it look like a benign scientific procedure. Not incidentally, 
by imparting a medical-like aura to the whole process, it 
ensures that the profession of psychiatry will retain control 
of these institutions, and not yield it to the other nonmed­
ical groups. 
So the real issue in DSM-111 is power, the immense power 
that comes from being able to define another's reality. 
And like so many cases where power is at stake, corrup­
tion is not far behind. In the medical-psychiatric profes­
sion, where most people are indoctrinated not to look at 
such matters, this side goes unnoticed. Younger doctors, 
who have not yet been dulled into the obtuseness char­
acteristic of the mature professional, often express an 
instinctive disgust for the way DSM-111 would have them 
look at people. I would hope that this attitude be en­
couraged, and that it grow into a genuine understanding 
of what emotional disturbance is all about-an under­
standing that should not rule out, by the way, the existence 
of discrete syndromes or biological levels of causation. I 
would insist, though, that genuine understanding of emo­
tional disturbance include a confrontation with the power 
that makes and keeps people sick. 
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